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Yeon-Koo Che Kathryn E. Spier
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Abstract: This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single
defendant and N plaintis when there are xed costs of litigation. When
making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it oers to the plaintis, the defendant
adopts a divide and conquer strategy. Plaintis settle their claims for less
than they are jointly worth. The problem is worse when N is larger, the
oers are sequential, and the plaintis make oers instead. Although divide
and conquer strategies dilute the defendant's incentives, they increase the
settlement rate and reduce litigation spending. Plaintis can raise their
joint payo through transfer payments, voting rules, and covenants not to
accept discriminatory oers.(JEL: K4, C7, D8)
Keywords: litigation, settlement, class actions, bargaining, divide and con-
quer, contracting with externalities
1 Introduction
This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N plaintis
when there are economies of scale in litigation. In particular, litigation is assumed to
involve xed costs that will be spread among the plaintis who go to trial. Consequently,
the decision of one plainti to settle out of court imposes a negative externality on the
remaining plaintis. The defendant can easily exploit the plaintis in this environment,
coercing the plaintis to settle for far less than their claims are jointly worth. This is
robust to the timing of oers and the structure of information.1
The authors thank discussants Jennifer Reinganum and Alexander Stremitzer, and many conference
participants for helpful comments and lively discussion. Kathryn Spier acknowledges the nancial
support from the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at the Harvard Law School.
1But see the accompanying discussion of Stremitzer [forthcoming].
1We begin by considering the case of symmetric information and identical plaintis.
The defendant has all of the bargaining power, making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it
oers to the plaintis before trial. The unique coalition proof Nash equilibrium involves
a divide and conquer strategy (Segal [2003]) where the defendant discriminates among
the otherwise identical plaintis, making generous oers to some plaintis and oering
less to others. When the number of plaintis is large, the externalities are more severe
and a signicant fraction of the plaintis receive nothing at all in equilibrium. The
plaintis would be better o in aggregate if they coordinated their actions and made
jointly optimal settlement decisions. Coordination may be achieved through a variety of
mechanisms. First, the plaintis could raise their joint payos by committing ex ante to
a single acceptance decision (i.e. through a unanimous voting rule). Second, the plain-
tis could achieve higher payos through a commitment not to accept discriminatory
oers. Finally, the exchange of side payments would allow the plaintis to overcome
the externalities and achieve a jointly optimal outcome. These mechanisms raise the
plaintis' aggregate recovery and provide greater incentives to the defendant to take
precautions to avoid accidents.2
Next, we suppose that the defendant approaches the plaintis in a predetermined
order, making sequential take-it-or-leave-it oers to each. Interestingly, the plaintis
may be even worse o in this scenario. When the economies of scale in litigation are
suciently strong (or, equivalently, the number of plaintis suciently large) then the
plaintis each receive a zero payo. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the plaintis are
no better o when they have the power to make take-or-leave-it oers to the defendant
instead. To see why this is true, imagine that the economies of scale are suciently
strong that a single plainti would never nd it protable to pursue an individual claim.
The defendant can exploit the situation, accepting just N   1 of the oers, thereby
inducing the Nth plainti to drop his claim. This creates a \race to the bottom" where
plaintis make negligible settlement demands to avoid being left out of the deal.
Additional insights emerge when the plaintis have private information about their
damages. To simplify the analysis, we restrict our attention to the case of just two
plaintis with independently distributed damages. We rst establish a benchmark where
the two plaintis can observe each others' types and make transfer payments to each
other. There are no coordination failures between the plaintis in this benchmark,
although trials do occur in equilibrium as a result of the private information. When
neither plainti can observe the other plainti's type and transfers are impossible, we
show that the defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy, making a more attractive
oer to one plainti than the other. The defendant's aggregate payments are lower than
in the case where the plaintis could coordinate their actions. Moreover, trials are less
2Increased incentives may or may not raise social welfare, depending on whether the defendant was
overdeterred or underdeterred to begin with. See Polinsky and Rubinfeld [1988] on the deterrence
eects of settlement and Shavell [1997] for a good discussion of the social value of litigation.
2likely to occur than in the benchmark case. This implies a social welfare benet that
would counterbalance to some extent any welfare loss from reduced deterrence.
Our paper is part of the broader literature on contracting with externalities (Segal
[1999]; Segal and Whinston [2000]). This literature studies the nature and eciency
of bilateral contracting when bilateral trade generates multilateral externalities. As
described in Segal [2003], divide and conquer strategies naturally arise in applications
such as corporate takeovers (Grossman and Hart [1988]), competition among internet
service providers (Caillaud and Jullien [2003]), and exclusive contracts (Innes and
Sexton [1994]; Segal and Whinston [2000]; Rasmusen et. al. [1991].) In the
exclusive contracting setting, for example, divide and conquer strategies are socially
undesirable because they can deter the entry of a more ecient supplier. In our setting,
divide and conquer strategies have the social benet of raising the settlement rate and
reducing litigation costs in the presence of asymmetric information.
There is also a large literature on the settlement of litigation. Surveys of this liter-
ature include Spier [2007], Daughety [2000], and Cooter and Rubinfeld [1989].3
While much of this literature focuses on situations involving a single plainti and a sin-
gle defendant, others have explored strategic issues that arise when there are multiple
interested parties. Take, for example, the situation where several defendants are impli-
cated in a single plainti's damages. Under joint and several liability, a single losing
defendant can be held personally responsible for the entire level of the plainti's dam-
ages. Kornhauser and Revesz [1994a, 1994b] show that the settlement externalities
hinge on both the legal treatment of prior settlements and on the degree of correlation
between the defendant's cases.4 Spier [2002] considers the related problem of a single
defendant negotiating with several plaintis when the defendant's wealth is insucient
to cover the damages should all plaintis win at trial. Che and Yi [1993] consider the
incentives of a single defendant to settle sequential suits when the judgments in early
cases will bind on future cases. Other papers that explore information externalities in
sequential litigation include Daughety and Reinganum [1999, 2002] and Hua and
Spier [2005].5
Several other papers in the law and economics literature have explored the incentives
to plaintis to consolidate their claims into class actions for the purpose of litigation
and/or settlement. Che [1996] assumes that there are cost economies of consolidation,
and that the plaintis who join a class will forgo ne-tuned awards and receive instead
the average damage of the group. Che aruged that plaintis with weak cases are more
3See also Hay and Spier [1998] and Daughety and Reinganum [2005].
4Subsequent work includes Spier [1994], Klerman [1996], and Chang and Sigman [2000].
5Choi [2003] and Bebchuk and Guzman [1996] study conicts between plaintis and their attor-
neys; Meurer [1992] and Sykes [1994] explore externalities between defendants and liability insurers;
Spier and Sykes [1998] consider conicts between debt and equity; Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar
[2007] explore externalites between criminal defendants; Spier [2003a, 2003b] and Daughety and
Reinganum [2004] consider externalities created by most-favored-nations clauses.
3likely to join a class, since they would prefer to receive the average damage award, while
plaintis with strong cases would opt out. The adverse selection problem is mitigated,
however, when plaintis are privately informed. Weak plaintis have an incentive to
remain independent, too, in an attempt to \signal" that they have strong cases and, in
equilibrium, fewer weak plaintis join the class. Che [2002] argues that classes may form
to increase the members' bargaining power via information aggregation. The defendant
is more generous when bargaining with the class as a whole than when bargaining with
individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and character-
izes an important benchmark. Section 3 characterizes the divide and conquer equilibrium
when the defendant makes simultaneous oers to the plaintis, and discusses implica-
tions for class formation and incentives for care. Section 4 extends the basic model
to sequential settlement oers, plainti bargaining power, and asymmetric information.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
N identical plaintis are suing a common defendant. The plaintis' aggregate damages
are D. At trial, an individual plainti will receive an award equal to his share of the
total damages,
x(N) =
D
N
:
This is the plainti's award regardless of how many other plaintis have settled their
claims out of court.6 In contrast, a plainti's litigation cost will depend critically on how
many other plaintis have settled (or dropped) their claims. Specically, the aggregate
litigation costs for the plainti and the defendant, Cp and Cd, are assumed to be xed.
If n  N plaintis go to trial, the litigating plaintis will split the xed costs evenly,
each plainti bearing
cp(n) =
Cp
n
:
The per-capita net recovery for a plainti when litigating with a group of size n is
therefore given by
x(N)   cp(n) =
D
N
 
Cp
n
:
Note that a plainti's net recovery at trial is decreasing in N, the total number of
plaintis, but increasing in n, the number of plaintis who actually go to trial. We will
6In practice, the plaintis' aggregate recovery (and the defendant's corresponding liability) would
often increase with the number of plaintis. See the accompanying discussion of Reinganum [forth-
coming]. We adopt this normalization in order to isolate how the settlement externalities depend on
the number of plaintis without changing the magnitude of the stakes.
4maintain the assumption throughout the paper that D   Cp > 0. This implies that if
all N plaintis went to trial then each individual plainti would receive a positive net
return, x(N)   cp(N) > 0.
A plainti's net return from going to trial alone will be positive if N is small but
negative if N is large. It is easy to see why this is true. Suppose that N = 1. This
one plainti would surely derive positive value from litigating alone: x(1)   cp(1) =
D   Cp > 0. When N = 2, however, the plainti's return from litigating alone is
x(2)   cp(1) = D=2   Cp. He only receives half of the damages but bears the entire
xed cost. When N = 3, a plainti's return from litigating alone falls even further,
x(3) cp(1) = D=3 Cp. The plainti's return from trial alone is clearly negative when
N is suciently large, for D=N   Cp !  Cp < 0 as N ! 1. Let N be dened as
N
 := supfNj x(N)   cp(1)  0g:
In other words, N is the largest integer where even a single plainti can achieve a
positive net return at trial.
Next, we dene m(N) to be the smallest group size where plaintis in this group
would enjoy a positive return if all m(N) members of the group went to trial. That is,
m(N) := inffnj x(N)   cp(n)  0g
or, equivalently
m(N) := inf

n

 
n
N

Cp
D

:
For a strategic purpose, m(N) represents the minimal group size who can pose a credible
threat to the defendant. Notice that m(N) is weakly increasing in N. When N  N,
m(N) = 1, so even a single plainti has a positive expected value claim. If N > N,
then m(N) > 1. When N increases in this range, a weakly larger group size m(N) is
required to make litigation jointly protable for the plaintis. If we take the limit as N
approaches innity we nd that m(N)=N converges to exactly Cp=D.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, the defendant makes oers
to each of the N plaintis, S = fS1;:::;SNg. These oers are publicly observed. With-
out loss of generality, we will also assume that these oer are nondecreasing in i. In
the second stage, the plaintis decide simultaneously and non-cooperatively whether to
accept or reject their respective oers. Plaintis who accept oers immediately receive
payment and exit the game. In the third stage, any remaining plaintis must decide si-
multaneously and non-cooperatively whether to drop their cases or proceed to trial. The
trials take place in stage four. Our equilibrium concept throughout the paper is subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in coalition-proof strategies. More specically, our equilibrium
requires the strategies to form a Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium for each subset
of plaintis | namely for there to be no other strategies that provide strictly higher pay-
os for any group of plaintis | in every subgame. This renement, due to Bernheim,
5Peleg, and Whinston [1987], is employed here to ensure that the exploitation of the
externalities does not simply stem from equilibrium selection or simple coordination fail-
ure on the part of the plaintis. While the plaintis are allowed to make coalition-proof
acceptance decisions, we do not allow for explicit negotiation among plaintis with side
payments. We shall later draw an implication of such negotiation abilities.
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider a benchmark in which the externalities
facing the plaintis are fully internalized. This can be done for instance if the plaintis
are represented by a benevolent agent who makes acceptance decisions for the plaintis
in the joint best interest. The following observation is immediate.
Proposition 1. (Benchmark) If the plaintis make a jointly optimal decision, then
the defendant's total payment or, equivalently, the plaintis' aggregate recovery, is L(N) = PN
i=1 Si = D   Cp.
3 Analysis
3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
This section characterizes the unique coalition-proof equilibrium of the game. In particu-
lar, we show that the defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy that discriminates
among the dierent plaintis. Some plaintis receive very generous settlement oers
while other plaintis receive much less. Indeed, when the number of plaintis N is large
then a sizable fraction of the plaintis will receive nothing at all.
For the purpose of illustration, suppose that N = 2 and that x(2)   cp(1) = D=2  
Cp > 0. Each plainti has a credible unilateral threat to take the defendant to trial in
this case. If the plaintis make jointly optimal decisions as in the previous benchmark,
the defendant could do no better than oer S1 = S2 = D=2 Cp=2 to each plainti (plus
a penny perhaps). The plaintis are weakly better o accepting these oers than going
to trial, and the defendant pays a total of S1 + S2 = D   Cp in settlement.
The defendant does strictly better when the plaintis make decentralized decisions,
however. To see why, suppose that the defendant oers S2 = D=2   Cp=2 to the second
plainti but makes a much less generous oer to the rst plainti, S1 = D=2   Cp. It
is a dominant strategy for the second plainti to accept his relatively generous oer.
Knowing this, the rst plainti would accept the less generous oer. The defendant
pays strictly less to the plaintis through this divide and conquer strategy: S1 + S2 =
D   3Cp=2. The defendant is, essentially, taking advantage of the plaintis' inability to
internalize the settlement externalities.
The next proposition states the general result.
Proposition 2. There is a unique coalition-proof equilibrium of the game. The defen-
dant oers S = fS1;:::;SNg where Si = maxf0;x(N)   cp(i)g, and these oers are all
accepted by the plaintis.
6Proof: We can show that if the defendant oers Si to plainti i = 1;:::;N, then
it is a coalition-proof equilibrium for the plaintis to all accept the oers. To see this,
take an arbitrary coalition Ik  f1;:::;Ng with jIkj = k  1. If all members of coalition
Ik rejected their oers, then each member of the coalition would receive maxf0;x(N) 
cp(k)g. Since Si is nondecreasing in i by construction, we must have
max
i2Ik
Si  Sk = maxf0;x(N)   cp(k)g:
This implies that some member of coalition Ik must receive a settlement oer of at
least maxf0;x(N) cp(k)g. This is the amount that member would get if the coalition
rejected their settlement oers and went to trial. This member is clearly weakly better
o accepting the settlement oer. Therefore it is a coalition proof equilibrium for all
plaintis to accept their respective oers.
Next, we show that S = fS1;:::;SNg, where Si = maxf0;x(N)   cp(i)g is the best
sequence of oers that the defendant can make, given the coalition-proof renement.
Observe rst that with S, the defendant is paying strictly less to any coalition of plaintis
than she would pay in total if she were to take that coalition to trial. This follows from
the fact that Si < x(N) for all i while at trial the defendant would pay on average more
than x(N) to for each plainti. Hence, it suces to show that S is the lowest set of
oers that she can make that will be accepted in any coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
To prove this, consider any set of oers ~ S := f~ S1;:::; ~ SNg listed in the ascending order.
Suppose ~ Sk < Sk = maxf0;x(N)   cp(k)g. Since the oers are in ascending order, we
have
~ Si < Sk = maxf0;x(N)   cp(k)g for each i = 1;:::;k;
Hence, in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, a coalition of plaintis i = 1;:::k will not
accept the oers ~ S. This proves that for ~ S to be accepted by the plaintis in a coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium, we must have ~ Sk  Sk for each k = 1;:::;N, which proves that
S is the optimal oer for the defendant.
3.2 Equilibrium Payos
We now characterize the plaintis' payos and the defendant's loss in equilibrium, which
will yield a useful implication later for ex ante deterrence. It follows from the equilib-
rium characterization that the defendant's total payments or, equivalently, the plaintis'
aggregate recovery, is given by
L(N) =
N X
i=1
maxf0;x(N)   cp(i)g:
It is of particular interest to see how this function varies with the total number of
plaintis. Since the upper bound for the loss, L(N) = D   Cp, is independent of N
7(because of our normalization), this function L() will reveal whether the problem of
externalities worsen or improve as a function of N.
Recall that N is dened to be the largest number of plaintis where even a single
plainti has a positive expected value claim. When N  N then the rst settlement
oer in the set S is positive, or S1 = x(N)   cp(1) > 0. It follows that all of the
settlement oers are strictly positive: Si = D=N   Cp=i, i = 1;:::N. The defendant's
total settlement payments in this case may be written:
L(N) = D  
N X
i=1
Cp
i
:
The sum
PN
i=1(1=i) is a called a \harmonic number" or HN. HN is an increasing function
and diverges slowly as N approaches innity. Hence, the function L(N) is decreasing in
the number of plaintis, N.
Now suppose instead that N > N. In this case, the equilibrium sequence of oers
is characterized by Si = 0 for i = 0;:::;m(N) 1 and Si = x(N) cp(N) = D=N  Cp=i
for i = m(N);:::N. The defendant's total settlement payments as a function of N are:
L(N) = [N   m(N) + 1]
D
N
 
N X
i=m(N)
Cp
i
L(N) is decreasing in this range as well.
Proposition 3. The defendant's total payment, L(N), is a decreasing function of N.
Furthermore, L(1) = D Cp and, in the limit as N approaches innity, L(N) converges
to D   Cp + Cp ln(Cp=D) > 0.
Proof: We will rst show that L(N), is a decreasing function of N. The case of
N  N has already been proven. We will therefore focus on the second case where
N > N. In this case, we can rewrite
L(N) = D   [m(N)   1]
D
N
  Cp
N X
i=m(N)
1
i
;
where
m(N) =

NCp
D

(where de means the smallest integer no less than ().) We are interested in signing
L(N + 1)   L(N). To this end, observe rst
m(N + 1) =

NCp
D
+
Cp
D

 m(N) + 1;
8since Cp < D. In other words, either m(N + 1) = m(N) or m(N + 1) = m(N) + 1. We
consider each of the two cases in turn. Suppose rst m(N + 1) = m(N). Then,
L(N + 1)   L(N) = [m(N)   1]

D
N

  [m(N)   1]

D
N + 1

 
Cp
N + 1
=

m(N)   1
N + 1

D
N
 
Cp
m(N)   1

 0;
where the inequality follows from the denition of m(N).
Suppose next m(N + 1) = m(N) + 1. Then,
L(N + 1)   L(N) = [m(N)   1]

D
N

  m(N)

D
N + 1

 
Cp
N + 1
+
Cp
m(N)
=

m(N)
N + 1

D
N
 
Cp
m(N)

 
D
N
+
Cp
m(N)
=

m(N)   (N + 1)
N + 1

D
N
 
Cp
m(N)

 0;
where the inequality holds since D=N   Cp=m(N)  0 and since m(N) < N + 1.
Next, we will establish the limit as N approaches innity. Rewrite the defendant's
total payments as:
L(N) = D   D

m(N) + 1
N

  Cp
N X
i=1
1
i
+ Cp
m(N) 1 X
i=1
1
i
:
or
L(N) = D   D

m(N) + 1
N

  CpHN + CpHm(N) 1:
We will now take the limit as N approaches innity. The harmonic number HN has
the property that lim[HN   ln(N)] =  where  is the Euler constant 0:57721:::. We
therefore have
limL(N) = D   Dlim

m(N) + 1
N

+ Cp lim[ln[m(N)   1]   ln(N)]
or
limL(N) = D   Dlim

m(N) + 1
N

+ Cp limln

m(N)   1
N

:
In the limit we have
m(N)   1
N
=
Cp
D
:
9So we have
limL(N) = D   Cp + Cp ln
Cp
D
:
It is straightforward to show that this is positive for all Cp < D. Let x = Cp=D. By
our earlier assumptions, we know that x 2 (0;1). To show that limL(N) is positive, it
is sucient to show that f(x) = 1   x + xlnx > 0 for all x 2 (0;1). We know that this
is true because f(1) = 0 and f0(x) = ln(x) < 0 for all x 2 (0;1).
3.3 Implications and Discussion
The previous section showed that plaintis are jointly exploited by the defendant through
settlement. The negative externality associated with individual settlement decisions
leads the plaintis to settle their claims for too little overall. In aggregate, the plaintis
receive less than D   Cp, what they would receive if they all went to trial. Moreover,
their joint payo is falling in the number of plaintis. These results have important im-
plications for both the incentives of the defendant to take precautions to avoid accidents
to begin with, and the incentives of plaintis to organize themselves into classes.
Importantly, the presence of multiple plaintis reduces the incentives of the defendant
to take care. This follows immediately from the fact that L(N) < D   Cp whenever
N > 1. This is an important result. Although the defendant is exploiting plaintis
through settlement ex post, there are no ex post welfare implications of this exploitation.
The exploitation leads to a simple redistribution of value away from the plaintis and
towards the defendant. When ex ante behavior is taken into account, however, then we
nd that the bargaining outcome is relevant for social welfare. If the defendant would
take optimal or even suboptimal precautions when he expects to pay D   Cp to the
victims of an accident, social welfare will surely fall when L(N) < D   Cp. Moreover,
this welfare loss is larger when the number of plaintis, N, rises.
The plaintis clearly have a joint incentive to overcome this problem of externalities.
There are several ways for the plaintis to accomplish this objective.
First, the plaintis might agree to make a single acceptance decision for all plaintis,
decided by a unanimous rule (after the defendant's oers).7 Given such a commitment,
the plainti who received the smallest oer will be pivotal in making acceptance decision.
Under the unanimity rule, this plainti can send the entire class to trial by vetoing the
proposal, and doing so will give him a payo of (D   Cp)=N. Plaintis will clearly
reject oers for less than this amount, and so the defendant can do no better than oer
(D   Cp)=N to each and every to every plainti.
7We consider ex post contracting by the plaintis, made only after the defendant makes oers to the
plaintis. If the plaintis can make ex ante commitment, they may be able to do better. They might
be able to commit themselves to only accept oers that are, in aggregate, higher than D + Cd. Such a
strategy would be susceptible to renegotiation, however.
10Second, the same outcome could be attained ex ante if the plaintis can commit not
to entertain discriminatory oers by the defendant. If such a commitment is credible,
then the defendant must make the same oer to every plainti. Whenever the uniform
oer is strictly less than (D Cp)=N, it is a coalition-proof Nash response by the plaintis
to reject the oer (individually), and realize the aggregate payo of D Cp jointly from
trial.8 Hence, the defendant will oer (D   Cp)=N to every plainti, just as in the
benchmark. Plaintis may achieve such a commitment with the help of a policy or
court regulation prohibiting discriminatory oers. Indeed, in class action suits, courts
often intervene settlement processes, in large part to protect the interest of the minority
plaintis. Such a protection of minority interests may very well serve to limit the ability
by the defendant to exploit the plaintis via its divide and conquer strategy. To the
extent that such a regulation restores socially desirable deterrence (or, as in Section 4,
a reduction in the incidence of costly trials), the current paper provides a rationale for
the courts' regulation of settlement procedures.
Finally, the plaintis may overcome the externalities problem by exchanging side
payments after receiving the oers from the defendant. As is well-known from the Coase
theorem, unexplored externalities on the part of the plaintis can be realized through
negotiation among them. For instance, the plaintis who expect to be harmed by settling
plaintis can bribe the latter not to settle, thus realizing the scale economies of litigation,
whenever it is jointly benecial. Again the ability to exchange side transfers can be
achieved within the organizational framework such as class actions or other mechanisms
that permit or even encourage such a negotiation.
Proposition 4. The plaintis can induce an aggregate oer from the defendant of D  
Cp, (i) if they can commit to make a single acceptance decision via a unanimous rule, or
(ii) if they can commit not to accept discriminatory oers, or (iii) if they can exchange
side payments.
4 Extensions and Robustness of Results
We show here that the exploitation of the plaintis' externalities is robust to a number
of extensions of our model.
4.1 Sequential Oers
Suppose that the defendant approaches plaintis in predetermined order, i = 1;:::N, and
makes a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it oers, S1;:::SN. Plainti i must either accept or
reject Si before the defendant moves on to plainti i+1, and the same process is repeated
8Although it may also be a Nash equilibrium for the plaintis to all accept lesser oers, acceptance
is Pareto dominated for the plaintis.
11with the full knowledge on both sides about the prior history of bargaining. After the
last plainti, plainti N, has made his acceptance decision, all remaining plaintis decide
simultaneously and non-cooperatively, but again in a coalition-proof fashion, whether to
proceed to trial. We will restrict attention to the case where N > N, so m(N) > 1 and
no plainti could prot from going to trial alone.
We show in this case that the defendant can exploit the plaintis' negative external-
ities to a point that no plainti can receives any positive payo. This is indeed a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that satises the coalition-proof renement. Sup-
pose that the defendant reaches the last plainti, and there have been n < N rejections
so far. If the last plainti rejects his or her settlement oer, then the coalition of plainti
N and the other n plaintis will go to trial if and only if n +1  m. Therefore plainti
N's outside option is maxf0;x(N)   cp(n + 1)g. If the defendant were to oer
^ Sn := maxf0;x(N)   cp(n + 1)g
then the plainti would be (just) willing to accept. The defendant is certainly better
o settling with plainti N on these terms, since he would otherwise pay x(N) to the
plainti at trial. (Since cd is xed, there are no incremental costs of the additional
plainti.)
Working backwards, suppose the defendant reaches the kth plainti in the sequence.
Arguing inductively, assume that the defendant will settle with all subsequent plaintis.
Then, the same argument as above establishes that, if there have been j rejections up
to that point, the defendant will oer in that subgame ^ Sj := maxf0;x(N)   cp(j + 1)g,
which is in turn accepted by the plainti. We therefore conclude that in a unique SPE
outcome has, in any subgame following j rejections, the defendant oer ^ Sj and the
plainti accepts it.
Applying this outcome to the rst round bargaining, the defendant oers ^ S0 =
maxf0;x(N) cp(1)g, and this is accepted by the rst plainti. By our earlier assump-
tion, x(N)   cp(1) < 0 so we have S0 = 0. The same behavior is repeated throughout.
That is, all plaintis receive zero payos. We have arrived at the following conclusion:
Proposition 5. Suppose m(N) > 1. If the defendant approaches the plaintis sequen-
tially, making take-it-or-leave-it settlement demands to each, then plaintis earn payos
of zero in equilibrium.
The externalities problem is clearly worse when m(N) > 1 and the defendant makes
sequential settlement oers. Interestingly, unlike the case of simultaneous oers, pro-
hibiting the defendant from making discriminatory oers does not solve the problem.
To see this, suppose the defendant faces two plaintis in sequence, and m(2) = 2, and
the defendant is required to oer to the second plainti the same amount as the one
accepted by the rst plainti. Suppose the defendant begins with a zero settlement to
the rst plainti. If this oer is accepted, then the second plainti has no case and will
12be willing to settle at zero, which is exactly when the defendant will oer, in compli-
ance with the regulation. If the rst plainti refuses the zero oer, however, then the
regulation has no bite, and the defendant is free to raise her oer to (D   Cp)=2 to
the second plainti. This ability to raise the oer to a later plainti is precisely what
enables the defendant to exploit the plaintis' externalities to such an extreme degree.
A typical non-discrimination clause (which has a binding eect only when earlier oers
are accepted) does not diminish that ability.
4.2 Plainti Bargaining Power
Suppose instead that the plaintis make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it oers to the
defendant. We continue to restrict attention to the case where N > N, so m(N) > 1
and no plainti could prot from going to trial alone. After receiving the set of oers,
the defendant decides which (if any) of the oers to accept and which to reject. The
plaintis are then informed of the defendant's decision and the decide, simultaneously
and non-cooperatively, but in a coalition-proof fashion, whether to drop their claims or
proceed to trial.
Since a single plainti will not pursue litigation, it is easy to see that there is an
equilibrium where all the plaintis receive a zero payo. Suppose that each plainti
demands settlement of 0, and the defendant accepts these oers. Clearly, no protable
deviation exists. If a plainti unilaterally deviates and demands a strictly positive oer,
the defendant will simply reject that oer (and accept all other oers of zero), and the
deviating plainti, being the lone plainti with a rejected oer, is unable to mount a
viable litigation.
More surprisingly, we show that this equilibrium is unique in pure strategies, so it is
coalition proof (in pure strategies). This proof involves several steps.
First, we will show that there cannot be any trials on the equilibrium path. Suppose
to the contrary that a set I or plaintis with size jIj = k > 1 proceed to trial. It follows
that the settlement demands Si of each plainti in this coalition, i 2 I, must have been
rejected by the defendant before trial. The defendant would have been weakly better o
settling with a single plainti in this group, i 2 I; for an amount Si so long as Si  Si
where
Si +
X
j2NnI
Sj + (k   1)x(N) =
X
j2NnI
Sj + kx(N):
The left hand side of this expression represents the defendant's payments if he settles
with plainti i (for Si) and the coalition NnI, but litigates against the remaining k   1
plaintis. The right hand side represents the defendant's payments if he settles with
the coalition NnI and litigates against the remaining k plaintis. Rearranging terms we
have
Si = x(N):
13The very least a single plainti i 2 I would be willing to accept for settlement is
Si = x(N)   cp(k) < x(N):
The fact that Si < Si implies that a protable deviation exists where a plainti can
unilaterally change his settlement demand to S 2 (Si;Si) and induce the defendant to
accept. Since plainti i is and the defendant are strictly better from such a deviation,
the hypothesized behavior, and hence trial, can never occur on the equilibrium path.
Second, we will prove that there must be at least one plainti receives a zero payo
in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that all plaintis receive strictly positive payos
in equilibrium. Since no trials occur in equilibrium by our previous argument, it must
be the case that the defendant accepts strictly positive settlement demands from all
of the plaintis. Clearly, this cannot be an equilibrium. Rather than accepting all of
the settlement oers, the defendant could have done strictly better by rejecting at least
m 1 such oers. (Once their oers are rejected, the m 1 plaintis will rationally drop
their claims.)
Finally, we show that no plainti can earn a strictly positive payo in equilibrium.
Suppose to the contrary that a plainti i earns strictly positive payo. This is possible,
given no trial, only if that plainti's settlement demand Si > 0 is accepted by the
defendant in equilibrium. By the previous claim, there also exists a plainti (call him
plainti j) who receives a zero payo. Suppose that plainti j unilaterally deviated
and made a settlement demand just slightly below the demand of plainti i, Sj = Si .
The defendant would receive a higher payo by accepting Sj and rejecting Si. Hence,
there will be no plainti with zero payo, which contradicts our earlier claim that there
must exist a plainti who receives a zero payo.
We have arrived at the following conclusion:
Proposition 6. Suppose m(N) > 1. In any pure-strategy equilibrium of the game where
the plaintis make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it settlement demands to the defendant,
the plaintis earn payos of zero.
4.3 Asymmetric Information
We now extend our previous analysis to include asymmetric information. Doing so
allows us to investigate the robustness of our results as well as the equilibrium bargaining
behavior in the presence of asymmetric information; but more importantly, asymmetric
information introduces positive probability of trial on the equilibrium path, so it gives
us an opportunity to study how the bargaining externalities aect the settlement/trial
rate. Rather than considering a general number of plaintis, we focus on the case where
N = 2. In this extension, the plaintis are privately informed about their (expected)
damage levels. We will see that the equilibrium is similar in many ways to the one
that would arise with complete information. First, the defendant adopts a divide and
14conquer strategy, oering more to one plainti than to the other. Second, the plaintis
are worse o in this equilibrium than they would be if they consolidated their claims or
could exchange side payments with each other. Last but not the least, it will be seen
that the inability to internalize litigation externalities leads to reduced incidence of trial.
Suppose that two plaintis are facing a defendant. Each plainti has expected dam-
ages x distributed (independently) over fxL;xHg with probabilities 1  and , respec-
tively, where xH > xL > 0. Further, we assume that
Cp
2
< xL < xH < Cp:
That is, a lawsuit is protable jointly but not so by oneself, regardless of the types.
This model introduces an interaction between litigation externalities and endogenous
settlement in a simple fashion.
The defendant makes a pair of oers (S1;S2) simultaneously, followed by the plaintis
deciding whether to accept and reject those oers. The plaintis' decisions are made in
a Pareto ecient fashion; namely, the equilibrium decisions made on any pair (S1;S2)
must be such that there is no other decisions on their part that will strictly Pareto
dominate the decisions. This ability to make a Pareto undominated decision does not
mean that the two plaintis will behave like a single decision maker. The source of
transaction cost or imperfect coordination here is two fold: First, the plaintis cannot
use transfers to overcome the externalities problem, just as in the previous setting.
Second, the plaintis do not observe each other's types, which could lead to a less than
perfect coordination between two plaintis. To appreciate how the externalities aect
the settlement decisions and outcomes, it is useful to begin with a benchmark in which
the two plaintis are able to perfectly coordinate their behavior, with the ability to
exchange transfers and to observe each other's type.
4.3.1 Benchmark: Perfect Coordination
Suppose the defendant has oered (S1;S2). The plaintis decide whether to accept the
oers in a way that maximize their joint payos, possibly making side payments to each
other. It is then clear then that the plaintis will never accept only one oer. They
will either accept both oers or neither oer. There are three possible strategies for the
defendant:
First, the defendant may choose to induce the plainti coalition to accept if and only
if they have both low damages. The necessary aggregate oer is SLL = 2xL   Cp. In
this case, the defendant's expected loss is
LLL := (1   )
2[2xL   Cp] + 2(1   )[xL + xH + Cd] + 
2[2xH + Cd]:
Second, the defendant may choose to induce the coalition to accept if and only if
they have one low and one high damages, or they both have low damages. The necessary
15total oer is SLH = xL + xH   Cp. In this case, the defendant's expected loss is
LLH := (1   
2)[xL + xH   Cp] + 
2[2xH + Cd]:
Third, the defendant may choose to induce settlement with certainty by oering
SHH = 2xH   Cp in total. Obviously, the defendant's expected loss in this case is
LHH := 2xH   Cp:
There are two threshold values,
^ 1 :=
xH   xL
xH   xL + 2(Cp + cd)
; ^ 2 :=
s
xH   xL
xH   xL + Cp + Cd
such that the rst strategy is optimal if  < ^ 1, the second is optimal if  2 [^ 1; ^ 2] and
the third is optimal if   ^ 2. The trial probability is then

() :=
8
<
:
1   (1   )2 if   ^ 1;
2 if  2 [^ 1; ^ 2];
0 if   ^ 2:
4.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Suppose now the plaintis now make Pareto undominated acceptance decisions in re-
sponse to any pair of oers (S1;S2) that the defendant may make. The equilibrium may
involve the defendant adopting one of the following divide and conquer strategies.
Strategy L: The defendant induces only one plainti to accept her oer only
when he has low damages.
Suppose plainti 1 is induced to accept when x = xL. Minimal oers that accomplish
this outcome is (S1;S2) = (xL Cp=2;0). Since plainti 2 rejects his oer, any lower oer
to plainti 1 will be rejected even when he has low damages. The defendant's expected
loss is then
~ LL() := (1   )(xL  
Cp
2
) + [(1   )(xL + xH + Cd) + (2xH + Cd)]:
Strategy LL: The defendant induces each plainti to accept her oer only when
he has low damages.
Minimal oers that accomplish this outcome is (S1;S2) = (xL Cp=2;(xL Cp=2)).
Even though only a low type plainti is induced to accept, given the externalities, the
lawsuit arises only when both plaintis have high types. A high damage plainti who
rejects his oer is unable to litigate when the other plainti settles. In other words,
16the defendant accomplishes the same outcome as she would have in the benchmark
by oering SLH in total settlement. Observe that a strictly smaller amount S1 + S2 =
(1+)(xL Cp=2) < SLH is needed to accomplish the same outcome due to the plaintis'
inability to coordinate their behavior. The defendant's expected loss is then
~ LLL() := (1   
2)(xL  
Cp
2
) + 
2(2xH + Cd):
Notice that, with these oers, the defendant faces a lawsuit only when both plaintis
have high damages.
Strategy H: The defendant induces only one plainti to accept her oer, regard-
less of his type.
Assume without loss that plainti 1 is induced to accept the oer. Minimal oers
that accomplish this outcome is (S1;S2) = (xH   Cp=2;0). By oering xH   Cp=2 in
total, the defendant can avoid any trial. Recall that twice this amount, SHH = 2xH Cp,
was needed to achieve the same outcome if the plaintis were able to coordinate their
decisions. The defendant's expected loss is then
~ LH := xH  
Cp
2
:
Notice that the defendant faces no lawsuit from plainti 2, now that plainti 1 settles
always. In fact, plainti 2 may as well accept the zero settlement. Strategy H also
employs divide and conquer tactics.
There is no other strategy that the defendant may use. For instance, the strategy of
inducing settlement from one plainti always and from the other only when he has low
type is the same as Strategy H.
In fact, strategy L is dominated by strategy LL, for
~ LL() ~ LLL() =  (1 )(xL 
Cp
2
)+(1 )(xL+xH+Cd) = (1 )(xH+Cd+
Cp
2
) > 0:
Consequently, we can simply focus on the comparison between strategy LL and
strategy H. It follows that there exists
~  :=
s
xH   xL
2xH   xL +
Cp
2 + Cd
2 (0; 1
2):
such that the defendant adopts Strategy LL if   ~  and Strategy H if   ~ . Trial
occurs with probability
() :=

2 if   ~ ;
0 if   ~ :
It is instructive to compare the equilibrium outcome in terms of the probability trial
as well as of the defendant's payment:
17Proposition 7. When the plaintis are privately informed about their damages, the
defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy. Trial occurs with a lower probability
in equilibrium than in the full-coordination benchmark (more precisely, ()  (),
with strict inequality for a positive measure of ). The defendant's payment is lower in
equilibrium than in the benchmark.
Proof: We rst observe that
~  =
s
xH   xL
2xH   xL +
Cp
2 + Cd
=
s
xH   xL
xH   xL + (xH  
Cp
2 ) + Cp + Cd
<
s
xH   xL
xH   xL + Cp + Cd
= ^ 2:
Hence, for  2 (~ ; ^ 2), () = 0 < () = 2. Now consider any   minf~ ; ^ 1g. In
this case, () = 2 < 1 (1 )2 = (). In all other values of , () = (). This
proves the rst statement. The last statement follows from the fact that
minf~ LLL; ~ LHg < minfLLL;LLH;LHHg:
It is not dicult to see why trial is less likely to occur when there are litigation
externalities. A plainti fails to internalize the cost he imposed on the other plainti
when settling with the defendant. Consequently, either plaintis settle too easily or they
fail to coordinate on their litigation, leaving a plainti stranded unable to litigate against
the defendant after rejecting her oer.9 As before, the defendant is a clear beneciary
of this inability of the plaintis to internalize the externalities, which she exploits by
the \divide and conquer" strategy, even in the presence of asymmetric information. The
reduced payment by the defendant again implies her reduced incentive to take care.
At the same time, the reduced likelihood of trial is socially desirable because of the
reduced litigation expenditures. Hence, unlike the case of symmetric information, the
exploitation of plaintis has a welfare benet which must be weighed against the loss
from weakened deterrence (if such a loss exists).
9Interestingly, the plaintis in our problem need not settle with probability 1   (). For instance,
when the defendant employs strategy LL, then a high type plaintis rejects the defendant's oer in
equilibrium, but fails to proceed to litigate the defendant if the other plainti happens to be a low type.
185 Conclusion
This paper looked at a simple bargaining model with a single defendant and N plaintis
when there are xed costs of litigation that will be spread among the plaintis who go
to trial. Externalities naturally arise in this setting because the decision of one plainti
to settle with the defendant out of court dilutes the value of the remaining plaintis'
claims. We showed that these externalities put the plaintis in a unusually vulnerable
position when bargaining with the defendant.
We started with the case where the defendant makes simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it
oers to the plaintis. The defendant adopted divide and conquer strategies in this
case, oering more to some plaintis than to others. Importantly, the defendant easily
exploited the plaintis through these strategies, coercing them into settling their claims
for less than they were jointly worth at trial. Moreover, we showed that the plaintis were
worse o when the number of plaintis is larger and when the defendant's settlement
oers are sequential instead of simultaneous. Somewhat surprisingly, the plaintis are
be worse o still when they had the power to make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it oers
to the defendant.
The analysis presented here has both positive and normative implications. On the
positive side, the analysis implies that the plaintis have a motive to write contracts
with each other and coordinate their strategies to improve their joint payos. This may
be accomplished through simple transfer payments among the plaintis, through explicit
voting rules, and through covenants not to accept discriminatory oers. On the nor-
mative side, the fact that the settlement externalities favor the defendant implies that
the defendant's incentives to take precautions at an ex ante stage are weakened. This
could, of course, be bad for society overall. Our analysis also highlights potential social
benets stemming from divide and conquer strategies. In the presence of asymmetric
information, we showed that the settlement rate was higher and overall litigation spend-
ing correspondingly lower than would be the case if the plaintis were able coordinate
their strategies. This social benet would counterbalance, to a greater or lesser extent,
the potential social losses due to reduced deterrence.
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